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preme Court and ultimately in the judiciary system itself, and greatly
eroded the "moral suasion" of the Court.
John S. Vento
LANDLORD-TENANT--EvICTION PROCEEDINGS-APPEAL BOND--The Su-
preme Court of the United States has held that a state statute requiring
a tenant to post a double-bond before appealing an adverse eviction
decision violates the equal protection clause.
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
Portland Bureau of Buildings officials declared appellee-landlord's
building to be unfit for human habitation' where-upon appellant-
tenants refused to pay their rent until the substandard conditions were
remedied. The landlord threatened eviction under the Oregon Forcible
Entry and Wrongful Detainer Statute2 and appellants filed a class action
requesting injunctive relief and seeking a declaratory judgment that
the statute was unconstitutional on its face. A three-judge district court
upheld the statute which provided that in eviction proceedings because
of nonpayment of rent: (1) trial must be held no later than six days
after service of the complaint on the tenant unless the tenant posts
security for payment of any rent that may accrue during the continu-
ance; (2) the issues litigable during the trial are restricted to those in-
volving tenant's default and consideration of defenses based on the
landlord's breach of any duty to maintain the premises are precluded;
(3) a tenant who wishes to appeal from an adverse decision is required
to post, in addition to the usual civil appeal bond, sureties for twice
the amount of rent expected to accrue pending appellate review, and
to forfeit this double bond to the landlord, if the lower court decision
is affirmed.4
I. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 58 n.2 (1972):
It was stipulated that city inspectors found rusted gutters, broken windows, broken
plaster, missing rear steps, and improper sanitation, all in violation of the Portland
Housing Code, and that the inspectors posted a notice that the dwelling was required
to be vacated within 30 days unless the owner could show cause why the building
should not be declared unfit for occupancy.
2. ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 105.105-.160 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as FED].
3. ORE. REV. STAT. § 19.040 (1971) provides:
Form of Undertaking on Appeal . . . (1) The undertaking of the appellant shall
be given with one or more sureties, to the effect that the appellant will pay all dam-
ages, costs and disbursements which may be awarded against him on the appeal .
4. Civ. No. 70-8 (D. Ore., Sept. 10, 1970).
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The Supreme Court held5 that the double-bond requirement violated
the tenant's guarantee of equal protection" but affirmed the district
court's holding as to constitutionality of the early trial provision and
the limitation on litigable issues.7
In holding that the tenants could be precluded in a FED action from
raising certain triable issues-principally, the landlord's failure to
maintain the premises-the Court relied heavily on its previous hold-
ings in Grant Timber & Manufacturing Co. v. Gray" and Bianchi v.
Morales.9
In Grant, a case involving timber allegedly misappropriated by de-
fendant, the Court held that due process was not violated by a Louisi-
ana statute which provided that one sued in a possessory action could
not bring a petitory action until a judgment was rendered in the posses-
sory action.' 0 Additionally, if the defendant lost in the possessory action
he must have satisfied that judgment before maintaining the petitory
suit." In his two-page opinion, Mr. Justice Holmes justified the Court's
result in large measure by looking back to ancient common law
authorities.' 2
In Bianchi, Mr. Justice Holmes' ten-sentence opinion relied in large
measure on the Grant rationale to sustain, against a due process attack,
a Puerto Rican mortgage law which permitted a foreclosure by sum-
mary suit in which no defense was permitted except payment.'3
Heavy reliance by the Court in Lindsey on Grant and Bianchi may
not have been justified since the cutting of timber and the foreclosure
of a mortgage, both having taken place in rural settings during the first
quarter of this century, did not address themselves to the considerations
inherent in an urban leasehold.1 4 Further, it is suggested that by con-
5. Justices Powell and Rehnquist took no part in this case.
6. 405 U.S. at 74-79.
7. Id. at 64-74. A discussion of the double-bond requirement and the early trial provi-
sion is beyond the intended scope of this note.
8. 236 U.S. 133 (1915).
9. 262 U.S. 170 (1923).
10. 236 U.S. at 134-35.
11. Id.
12. It would be a surprising extension of the Fourteenth Amendment if it were
held to prohibit the continuance of one of the most universal and best known dis-
tinctions of medieval law. From the "exception spolii" of the Pseudo-Isidore, the
Canon Law and Bracton to the assize of novel disseisin the principle was of very
wide application that a wrongful disturbance of possession must be righted before
a chain of title would be listened to-or at least that in a proceeding to right such
disturbance a claim of title could not be set up ..
Id. at 134.
13. 262 U.S. at 171.
14. In accord, at least as to Bianchi is Justice Douglas' dissent, 405 U.S. at 90. See also
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struing lessee's covenants as independent of lessor's, the Lindsey Court
has breathed new life into the heretofore dying concept of treating a
lease as a conveyance of land rather than as a contract, and in con-
sequence the lessee can be required to pay rent without a concomitant
duty by the lessor to repair. 15
Prior to Lindsey there had been a discernible trend by some courts
away from the early common law conveyance theory toward a contract
theory for leases, and courts have been willing to treat material
covenants-such as payment of rent and repair of defects-as mutually
dependent. Thus, if one party breaches, the other may be relieved of
his duty to perform.1 6 By relying on this contract theory of leases
courts have recently been willing to condition the payment of rent
upon an implied warranty of habitability.17 In Lemle v. Breeden18 the
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, LEGAL REMEDIES FOR HOUSING CODE VIOLA-
TIONS, RESEARCH REPORT No. 14, at 110-12 (1968).
15. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 290 (1932); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.78
(A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 233 (1967). For an early case vividly
illustrating the possible results to be had by a treatment of lessor's and lessee's covenants
as independent see Peterson v. Kreuger, 67 Minn. 449, 70 N.W. 567 (1897). There, plain-
tiff-landlord had leased property to the defendant-tenant for use by the latter as a hotel
When the tenant refused to pay his rent, plaintiff brought an action under a Minnesota
Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute for restitution of the property. Over plaintiff's ob-
jections, the trial court allowed defendant to enter evidence indicating that because of
the landlord's refusal to repair the roof of the hotel, some of the rooms had become unfit
for rental, thereby causing a loss of income to the tenant in an amount in excess of the
rent due under this action. The jury found that the damages sustained by the tenant
equaled the amount of rent due to the landlord and that the defendant was not guilty
of an unlawful detainer. The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed saying:
Even if it should be conceded that there was a breach on the part of the landlord
• . . of a covenant to repair the roof, express or implied, the court erred in permit-
ting [the tenant] to introduce evidence to support his so-called defense or counter-
claim, for in this form of action it was all irrelevant and inadmissible . . . A tenant
against whom an action was brought under this statute is not permitted to counter-
claim for damages arising from a breach of any covenant in the lease which is in-
dependent of the covenant to pay rent. . . . The object of the [FED] statute is to
provide an adequate and summary remedy for obtaining possession of leased prem-
ises withheld by tenants in violation of the covenants of their leases, and, so said in
one of the cases we have cited, "this object would be entirely frustrated if tenants
were permitted to interpose every defense usual or permissible in ordinary actions
at law."
Id. at 450, 70 N.W. at 568. See also Annot., 4 A.L.R. 1453 (1919):
Although there are a few decisions to the contrary, the great weight of authority
is to the effect that in the absence of statute there is no warranty implied in the let-
ting of an unfurnished house or tenement, that it is reasonably fit for habitation.
16. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952):
There is evidence that the law, by one means or another and without disturbing
the rules protecting the lessee's possessory rights, is moving toward an application
of contract principles to leases. The courts tend to speak of leases as contracts, and
an increasing number of cases treat material covenants as mutually dependent.
17. See Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 596, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412-13 (1961):
To follow the old rule of no implied warranty of habitability in leases would, in
our opinion, be inconsistent with the current legislative policy concerning housing
standards. The need and social desirability of adequate housing for people in this
era of rapid population increases is too important to be rebuffed by that obnoxious
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Supreme Court of Hawaii held that a tenant could recover his deposit
and rental payments upon discovering that the rental property was in-
fested with rats. The Court then noted:
The application of an implied warranty of habitability in leases
gives recognition to the changes in leasing transactions today. It
affirms the fact that a lease is, in essence, a sale, as well as a trans-
fer of an estate in land and is, more importantly, a contractual
relationship. From that contractual relationship, an implied war-
ranty of habitability and fitness for the purpose intended is a just
and necessary implication. 19
This rejection of the conveyance-caveat emptor theory in favor of
the contract-implied warranty of habitability position reached a high
point in Javins v. First National Realty Corporation20 with the court
noting that while the feudal property law concept of a lease conveying
primarily an interest in land may have been reasonable in a rural,
agrarian setting, such is not the case with an urban apartment dweller
legal clich, caveat emptor. Permitting landlords to rent 'tumbledown' houses is at
least a contributing cause of such problems as urban blight, juvenile delinquency,
and high property taxes for conscientious landowners.
See also Earl Millikin, Inc. v. Allen, 21 Wis. 2d 497, 124 N.W.2d 651 (1963); CAL. CIv.
CODE § 1941 (West 1954).
18. 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969). For a review of Lemle and rules relating to
implied warranty of habitability or fitness for use of leased premises see Annot., 40 A.L.R.
3d 637, 646 (1971).
19. 51 Hawaii at 433, 462 P.2d at 474. See also Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J.
444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969). There the Supreme Court of New Jersey re-examined the doc-
trine of caveat emptor in a situation where a tenant's premises were flooded after each
rain, and noted:
It has come to be recognized that ordinarily the lessee does not have as much
knowledge of the condition of the premises as the lessor. Building code requirements
and violations are known or made known to the lessor, not the lessee. He is in a
better position to know of latent defects, structural and otherwise, in a building
which might go unnoticed by a lessee who rarely has sufficient knowledge or exper-
tise to see or to discover them. A prospective lessee . . . cannot be expected to know
if the plumbing or wiring systems are adequate or conform to local codes. Nor should
he be expected to hire experts to advise him. Ordinarily, all this information should
be considered readily available to the lessor, who in turn can inform the prospec-
tive lessee. These factors have produced persuasive arguments for reevaluation of
the caveat emptor doctrine and for imposition of an implied warranty that the prem-
ises are suitable for the leased purposes and conform to local codes and zoning or-
dinances.
Id. at 452, 251 A.2d at 272; accord, Buckner v. Azulai, 251 Cal. App. 2d 1013, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 806 (1967). There has been considerable legal scholarship supporting the implied
warranty of habitability and fitness in lease situations. See Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii
426, 433 n.2, 462 P.2d 470, 474 n.2 (1969). A discussion of rent withholding statutes based
on an implied warranty of habitability is beyond the scope of this note. For a general
discussion see Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 637 (1971). For a discussion of the Pennsylvania Rent
Withholding Act in particular see 10 Duq. L. REV. 113.
20. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). For expressions of ap-
proval of Judge J. Skelly Wright's opinion in Javins see 29 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 152 (1970)
and 24 VAND. L. REV. 425 (1971).
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in 1970.21 The court stoutly rejected the doctrine of caveat emptor and
held ". . . the tenant's obligation to pay rent is dependent upon the
landlord's performance of his obligations, including his warranty to
maintain the premises in a habitable condition. '2 2 The court of appeals
also decided that the warranty of habitability was to be ". . . measured
by the standard set out in the Housing Regulations for the District of
Columbia and is implied by operation of law in all leases of urban
dwellings covered by those Regulations and that a breach of such war-
ranty gives rise to the usual remedies for breach of contract." 23
It was subsequent to these decisions which had given the tenant a
modicum of bargaining power against the landlord, where traditionally
he had had none,24 that Lindsey was decided.25 It is believed that with
the Lindsey case, the Court was presented with a clear opportunity to
stamp its imprimatur of approval on the rationale of such progressive
decisions as those in Reste, Lemle and Javins. Instead, after first noting
that the Constitution had not federalized the substantive landlord-
tenant law,26 the Court remarked that it ".... could see nothing to for-
bid Oregon from treating the undertakings of the tenant and those of
the landlord as independent rather than dependent covenants." 27 Thus
with only this cursory language the Court opted to sustain the medieval
common law concept of a lease being only a conveyance of land. In so
holding the majority implicitly also approved appendant doctrines of
independent covenants and caveat emptor which Javins had jettisoned
so persuasively.
21. 428 F.2d at 1078 n.39:
In 1968 more than two-thirds of America's people lived in the 228 largest metro-
politan areas. Only 5.2% lived on farms. The World Almanac 1970 at 251 (L. Long
ed.). More than 98% of all housing starts in 1968 were non-farm.
22. 428 F.2d at 1082.
23. Id. at 1072-73.
24. See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 701 (D.D.C. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016
(1969), citing Kay v. Cain, 154 F.2d 305, 306 (D.D.C. 1946). The court of appeals in Ed-
wards held, inter alia, that a tenant could not be evicted by a landlord in retaliation for
reporting housing code violations to public officials. (This opinion was written by Judge
J. Skelly Wright who two years later wrote the Javins opinion.) See also 2 R. POWELL,
REAL PROPERTY § 221[l] (1967).
25. The factual situation giving rise to the Javins case parallels in large measure that
of Lindsey, to-wit, in both, the tenants refused to pay their rent, whereupon the land-
lord initiated court action in an attempt to regain possession of the premises and the
tenant resisted on the basis of numerous housing code violations.
26. 405 U.S. at 68.
27. Id. However, Justice Douglas' dissent wherein he maintains that the Oregon state
courts have, in fact, adopted a contractual analysis of leaseholds and, thus, ".. . . all de-
fenses relevant to its legality and its actual operation would seem to be within the ambit
of the opportunity to be heard that is embraced within the concepts of due process ..
Id. at 87-89.
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It is believed that the Court in Lindsey, by failing to even acknowl-
edge the critical and complex issues inherent in an urban leasehold, as
exemplified by the discussion in Javins28 and other cases, has stalled, at
least in the absence of express legislative approval 2 9 any continued
trend toward equalization of power between tenant and landlord.A0
C. Timothy Shafjer
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION-The United States
Supreme Court has held that the first and fourteenth amendments to
the Constitution of the United States prevent a state from compelling
Amish children to attend formal high school to age sixteen.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller and Adin Yutzy, the respondents, are
members of the Old Order Amish religion and the Conservative Amish
Mennonite Church. They were charged, tried, and convicted of vio-
lating Wisconsin's compulsory attendance law' and fined the sum of
28. The majority did not cite Javins.
29. The Court recognized the diverse treatment landlord-tenant law enjoys in variousjurisdictions and that a state can legislatively provide for the withholding of rental pay-
ments by the tenant. Id. at 68-69.
30. By ignoring Javins, new impetus has been given to case results that are inapposite
to twentieth century urban America. See, e.g., McKey v. Fairbairn, 345 F.2d 739, (D.D.C.
1965). The court noted that in the absence of a promise to make repairs, the landlord
was not bound to repair a roof, the leakage of which caused a visitor in tenant's home to
fall and be injured. Id. at 742. The court quoted with approval from Security Savings
& Commercial Bank v. Sullivan, 261 F. 461 (D.D.C. 1919):
It is settled law that where the owner of premises, by lease, parts with the entire
possession and control of the premises, and the tenant, either by express provision of
the lease or by the silence of the lease on that subject, assumes liability for the keep-
ing of the premises in proper repair, the tenant, and not the owner, will be liable
in causes of an accident due to negligence in allowing the premises, or any portion
thereof, to get out of repair.
Id. at 120, 261 F. at 462. See also Foster v. United States, 214 F. Supp. 181 (S.D. Miss.
1963); 3 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 905 (1939); Annot., 150 A.L.R. 1373-84 (1944).
1. WIs. STAT. § 118.15 (1969) provides in pertinent part:
118.15 Compulsory school attendance
(1)(a) Unless the child has a legal excuse or has graduated from high school, any
person having under his control a child who is between the ages of 7 and 16 yearn
shall cause such child to attend school regularly during the full period and hours,
religious holidays excepted, that the public or private school in which such child
should be enrolled is in session until the end of the school term, quarter or semes-
ter of the school year in which he becomes 16 years of age.
(3) This section does not apply to any child who is not in proper physical or men-
tal condition to attend school, to any child exempted for good cause by the school
board of the district in which the child resides or to any child who has completed
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